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I. Introduction
Governments and sports organisations support segregated
men’s and women’s events to ensure that women have
the same chance as men at making finals and podiums
and winning championships. As this year’s FIFA
Women’s World Cup so powerfully demonstrated, these
opportunities are not only valuable to the individually
featured women; there is also tremendous social value
inherent in the competitions more generally. This value
flows most obviously to nations, sponsors and fans as
they experience strong female athletes competing and
winning on the international stage.
It is well-understood that the empowerment effects of
these experiences are different from those that result from
seeing men compete together, and also different from
seeing open competition among men and women. Because
athletes whose biological sex is male have an
insurmountable competitive advantage over those whose
biological sex is female in most sports and events, if an
institution like the International Association of Athletics
Federations (IAAF) cares about this set of social goods,
it needs to protect the women’s category with eligibility
rules that either exclude biological males, or that at least
condition their inclusion on substantially reducing their
sex-linked competitive advantages. The performance gap
between the sexes makes clear that what matters for sport
is male and female sex, not the gender in which
individuals are raised or with which they identify.
This last proposition was challenged by the petitioner,
Caster Semenya, at the Court of Arbitration for Sport
(CAS).1 Although her biological sex is male for all
purposes relevant for sport, Semenya is legally female
and was raised and formally identifies as such.

Specifically, from the fact that she has standing to
challenge the relevant IAAF regulation, and from the
CAS award, it can be inferred that she has XY genetic
sex, testes not ovaries, and bioavailable testosterone (T)
levels in the normal male range. Competing mostly
against genetic females, she has dominated the women’s
800 metres globally for the last decade, including at the
World Championships and Olympic Games where she
has won five gold medals.
At CAS, Semenya did not challenge the premise that
sport is properly sex segregated. Rather, she argued that
the IAAF should be required to make an exception for
her and others similarly situated who attest that they were
assigned female at birth, raised consistent with that
assignment, and continue legally and publicly to identify
as women. In effect, she argued that she and others in her
circumstances have an overriding reliance interest in their
sex of rearing such that sport should ignore the fact that
biologically they are male. In the process, she sought to
distinguish her case facts from those of transgender
women on the ground that the latter would not have the
same longstanding, externally validated reliance interest.
Ruling in the context of a challenge to the most recent
iteration of the IAAF eligibility regulation, CAS
disagreed. The regulation places restrictions, including
hormonal conditions, on genetic males with particular
differences of sex development (DSDs) who seek to
compete in women’s events at the international level
(DSD Regulation). Specifically, CAS held that Semenya’s
proposed exception—for those within this group who
were raised as girls—would be category defeating.
The Panel was properly concerned about the DSD
Regulation’s implications for affected athletes. But the
evidence presented in the case made clear that if the IAAF
could not restrict their inclusion into women’s
competition, they would continue to have an outsized
effect on opportunities for the females for whom the
category was created, and on the IAAF’s ability to use
that category to promote its broader institutional goals.
Ultimately, it was this that tipped the scales in the IAAF’s
favour.
The result affirmed three essential principles of sport:
First, competition is lawfully sex segregated; equality for
female-bodied athletes remains a high-value proposition.2
Second, eligibility for the women’s category has to be
based on biology, not identity; a different rule would be
category defeating. Third, sports governing bodies
properly seek evidence-based solutions to the problem
that is including male-bodied athletes who identify or are
legally identified as women in the women’s category;
because it treads on sensitive ground, this work is difficult
and often unpopular but it remains the right thing do to.

*

Doriane Lambelet Coleman is a Professor of Law at Duke Law School. She served as an expert for the IAAF in Semenya & Athletics South Africa v IAAF.
Mokgadi Caster Semenya & Athletics South Africa v International Association of Athletics Federations, CAS 2018/O/5794.
Because Semenya and ASA did not challenge the legality of the IAAF’s policy choice to segregate competition on the basis of sex, the Panel did not have occasion formally
to rule on this threshold point. Semenya at 461. Nevertheless, in establishing both the necessity and the proportionality of the DSD Regulation, it effectively affirmed the
lawfulness and value of the categories. See, e.g. Semenya at 566–568.
1
2

[2019] I.S.L.R., Issue 4 © 2019 Thomson Reuters and Contributors

84

Sweet & Maxwell’s International Sports Law Review

The remainder of this article proceeds as follows: Part
II provides the context necessary to understand the origins
of the case and summarises the essential aspects of the
decision. Part III responds to a critique of the decision by
Michele Krech which appeared in the last issue of this
journal.3 It concludes with some reflections on the broader
significance of the case.

II. Background and summary of the case
For decades, the Olympic Movement has segregated most
competitions on the basis of sex, and it has monitored
eligibility for the women’s category to ensure equality
for females and to secure the broader social goods that
flow from empowering females in sport.4 Despite
suggestions to the contrary, monitoring is necessary.
Although they are relatively few and their goal is rarely
if ever to deceive, in fact athletes whose biological sex
is male but who present as women have continuously
sought to compete in the women’s category. When they
have done so, consistent with their male biological
advantage, they have been overrepresented at the podium
level.5
In the modern period, the IAAF has been steadfast in
its commitment to equality for female athletes,6 but its
approach to protecting the category has evolved.
Originally, the point was simply to exclude athletes whose
biological sex was male without regard to how they might
personally or legally identify. More recently, it has sought
to include athletes whose biological sex is male who
identify as women where those athletes demonstrate that
they do not have or else have wound down their
male-linked advantages.7 In addition to its regulations for
transgender athletes,8 the two most recent iterations of
this approach are the 2011 Hyperandrogenism Regulation9
and the 2018 DSD Regulation.10 Where the first focuses
on transgender athletes, the second and third focus on
genetic males with DSD who were assigned the female
sex at birth and whose legal identity is also female. DSDs
may be described as intersex conditions and individuals
with DSD may be described as intersex.

The 2011 Hyperandrogenism Regulation required
genetic males with DSD (46XY DSDs) who presented
legally as women to reduce their testosterone (T) levels
to below the bottom of the distinct male reference range
if they wished to compete in the women’s category.
Assuming that the bottom of the normal male range was
10 nmol/L, the cut-off chosen at the time for both DSD
and transgender athletes was below 10.11 In 2014, Indian
sprinter Dutee Chand challenged the regulation at CAS
alleging unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex. In
2015, CAS suspended its terms for a two-year period to
give the IAAF time to produce evidence confirming that
the advantages associated with the affected conditions
were sufficient to justify the discrimination at issue in
that case.12 The suspension was effective through the 2015
World Championships in Beijing and the 2016 Olympic
Games in Rio.
The 2018 DSD Regulation was developed in that
interim period based on the additional evidence adduced
in support of the 2011 Regulation, but also on a policy
choice to adopt a narrower rule. Unlike the
Hyperandrogenism Regulation which applied to more
conditions and all events, the DSD Regulation applies
only to genetic males with DSD who have full or
significant androgen sensitivity and who seek to compete
in international events from the 400 metres to the mile.
The evidence is especially strong that DSD athletes have
an outsized, male-linked performance advantage in these
events. They are required to reduce their T levels to within
the distinct female range. That range is from 0.06 nmol/L
to 1.68 nmol/L, but because some females with polycystic
ovaries have—in very rare cases—T levels up to 4.8
nmol/L, the cut-off was set at 5.13
Both iterations of the eligibility rule were policy
compromises. It is well-understood scientifically that
testosterone is the primary but not the only driver of the
performance gap between males and females.14 However,
if the goal is to protect the women’s category while being
as inclusive as possible of males who identify as women,
using testosterone as a proxy for the male athletic
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advantage makes a lot of sense. In addition to its critical
role in building and sustaining the male body in the
respects that matter for sport,15 T levels are easy to
establish relative to the more comprehensive physical
examinations that typically characterise the standard
differential diagnosis for sex; and sport already tests for
T levels in the context of its doping control efforts.16
Although they both focused on T levels, the 2018 DSD
Regulation was an important improvement on the 2011
Hyperandrogenism Regulation. The premise of the earlier
regulation was flawed because the athletes of concern are
not “hyperandrogenic females” or, more colloquially,
“females with high T”; they are biological males with
XY genetic sex, testes and normal male T levels.17
Moreover, if the goal is to make exceptions that are not
category defeating, requiring male-bodied athletes who
identify as women to wind down their T levels to the
point where they could be produced by the healthy female
body makes a lot more sense than an arbitrary point that
is more than three times higher than this. Finally, although
it struck many in the sports community as odd because
they understand that male T levels have
performance-enhancing effects across the board, as a legal
matter—because anti-discrimination law requires a close
means-ends nexus—narrowly tailoring the rule so that it
covers only those events where DSD athletes have been
a decades-long issue for the women’s category was smart
policymaking.18
Because the Hyperandrogenism Regulation was
withdrawn by the IAAF when it introduced the DSD
Regulation, and because Dutee Chand is a short sprinter
and is not affected by the new policy, her proceedings
were terminated.19 In contrast, as a long sprinter and
mid-distance runner, Caster Semenya remained an
“affected athlete”.20 Semenya does not want to reduce her
T levels from the male to the female range, and so she
and her federation, Athletics South Africa (ASA),
challenged the DSD Regulation shortly following its
publication in spring 2018. Formally, the principal
question presented to CAS was whether the regulation
governing eligibility for the women’s category is
unlawfully discriminatory because it treats athletes
differently based upon whether they have T levels within
or above the top of the female range, and conditions
participation by the latter to a potentially harmful and
allegedly unwarranted condition. Informally, the question
was whether the IAAF can condition the inclusion of
biological males into the women’s category on their
having at least wound down their T levels to within the
generously described female range.

Consistent with the law applicable to the IAAF (based
in Monaco) and CAS (based in Switzerland), the Panel
reviewed the question according to standard
anti-discrimination analysis. Because sex-affirmative
measures are acceptable when they are designed to
empower rather than to subordinate females,21 and because
Semenya did not challenge the IAAF’s policy choice to
have a protected category for females, the Panel began
from the premise that the category itself is lawful.22 It
agreed with Semenya’s threshold argument that the DSD
Regulation discriminates among athletes who are legally
women on the basis of their sex-specific biology,23 but
ultimately it accepted the IAAF’s positions that this
discrimination is warranted and that the eligibility
conditions are acceptable on balance.
Specifically, it agreed with the IAAF that to secure
the multiple, valuable goals of the women’s category, it
is necessary to base eligibility on biology not identity. It
agreed with Semenya that requiring the few male-bodied
athletes in any given period who identify as women
medically to reduce their T levels as a condition for
inclusion in certain women’s events could cause a range
of individual harms, especially if some of these athletes
would not otherwise choose to undergo this treatment.
However, because their unconditional inclusion has and
would continue to be category-defeating for the larger
group of female athletes, and for the IAAF more
generally, the Panel found that the Regulation’s conditions
were—on balance—proportional.
In doing so, the Panel rejected Semenya’s claim that
the IAAF seeks only to protect the goods that flow
specifically to the handful of female athletes who do not
make the podium when DSD athletes are on the track.
(Understandably, although this was not explicit, she and
ASA reject the notion that sport properly seeks to
celebrate female-bodied champions in the women’s
category, and to capitalise on the broader expressive
effects of that celebration.) The IAAF seeks not only to
protect the interests of individual female athletes but also
its ability to use the women’s category to accomplish its
broader institutional goals. While including DSD athletes
without condition would benefit a handful of them
disproportionately—that is, they could continue to win
medals and championships and to reap the personal and
financial rewards from those victories—it would harm
the larger group of females in the field and make it
difficult-to-impossible to continue to sustain the women’s
category for its intended ends.
The prospect that male-to-female (MTF) transgender
athletes could eventually benefit from Semenya’s case
for unconditional inclusion may also have been a factor
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21
“Sex in Sport” (fn. 4 above) at 67–70.
22
Semenya at 457, 461, 625.
23
Semenya at 547.
16
17

[2019] I.S.L.R., Issue 4 © 2019 Thomson Reuters and Contributors

86

Sweet & Maxwell’s International Sports Law Review

in the Panel’s proportionality analysis. Without regard to
how sport may eventually evolve, unconditional inclusion
of transgender women who are not on hormones would
undoubtedly defeat the women’s category as currently
designed. For this reason, Semenya and ASA sought to
distinguish 46,XY DSD athletes from transgender athletes
on the basis that the former have a reliance interest in
their birth sex assignment and their sex of rearing that
the latter cannot claim. Whatever its merits otherwise,
for sports purposes the distinction does not hold. The
following figure demonstrates this point using 5-alpha
reductase deficiency (5-ARD),24 one of the principal DSDs
at issue in the Semenya case.

Comparing biological sex traits for purposes of girls’
and women’s sport
T y p i c a l Person with Trans wom- Typical female
5-ARD
an not on male
hormones
Genetic sex 46 XY

46 XY

46 XY

46 XX

Testes

Testes

Testes

Ovaries

Gonads

Endocrine Androgenic Androgenic Androgenic Estrogenic
system and Male T lev- Male T lev- Male T lev- Female T
els
els
levels
sex
hor- els
mones25
Primary sex Testes, epi- Testes, epicharacteris- didymis and didymis and
vas defer- vas deferens
tics
ens, prostate (no prostate)

Testes, epididymis and
vas deferens, prostate

Ovaries, fallopian tubes,
uterus, vagina

Virilisation Yes
on puberty

Yes

Yes

No

Secondary Male
sex characteristics

Male

Male

Female

E x t e r n a l Penis, scro- Varies
genitalia26 tum

Penis, scro- C l i t o r i s ,
tum
labia

Legal sex27

Male

Varies

Varies

Female

Gender
identity

Male

Varies

Female

Female

The relevant physical equivalence between
transwomen not on hormones and genetic males with
DSD not on hormones may have combined with the
extraordinary political difficulties that would result from
a choice to privilege the latter (who may or may not
personally identify as female) over the former (who do
identify as female and may have done so since early
childhood) to place additional weight on the IAAF’s side
of the proportionality scales.
Finally, although the harms Semenya alleged were
important—to the point that one of the three members of
the Panel declined to join in the judgment—it was not
clear that they would result from the regulation itself, or
that they were always as weighty as described.
For example28: There was extensive testimony about
the emotional, familial and reputational harm that resulted
from public breaches in the confidentiality of the testing
process in the Semenya and Chand cases. This harm was
surely real and also significant, but the IAAF was not
responsible for those breaches and it is understood that
systems can be put into place to secure this information.
There was also extensive testimony about how difficult
it is for a person with a DSD to learn that they have such
a condition. Again, there is no doubt that this is a deeply
affecting experience. But as Semenya’s own
circumstances illustrate, not all affected athletes encounter
this challenge for the first time as a result of their
participation in international sport.29 And even when they
do, assuming confidentiality is properly maintained and
the conversation proceeds with appropriate consideration
and care, it is not clear that it is the disclosure rather than
the fact of the condition itself that is primarily distressing.
Indeed, where the condition has the potential for serious
adverse health effects—as both amenorrhea and
undescended testes do—disclosure may be difficult but
ultimately valuable.30
Finally, there was extensive testimony that going on
birth control pills (BCPs) to bring T levels into the female
range, including the trial and error associated with finding
the right prescription, can cause serious temporary
discomfort and also carries a small risk of serious adverse
health effects. But this is the same process and risk that
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US National Library of Medicine, Genetics Home Reference, 5-alpha reductase deficiency (2019).
Circulating testosterone concentration is used here as a marker of hormonal sex. When measured by LCMS, the 95% confidence limits are for the male range 7.7 to 29.4
nmol/L and for the female range (no PCOS) 0.06 to 1.68 nmol/L. Readings for females with PCOS may extend to 4.8 nmol/L (99.99% confidence limits). See Handelsman,
et al. (fn.13 above).
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Phenotype in this respect depends on the degree of alpha reductase deficiency, with the range of presentations from almost fully masculinised to feminised. See Kang et
al., “5a-reductase-2 Deficiency’s Effect on Human Fertility, Fertility and Sterility”, February 2014, available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4031759/
[Accessed 1 October 2019].
27
Some legal systems allow for a change in legal sex before/without transition, while others do not.
28
These examples were chosen because they were the weightiest and so appropriately took the most time. As Krech suggests, arguments were also presented which implied
that the DSD Regulation is racist, and primarily affects athletes from the developing world who come from poor rural areas. She suggests that this should have weighed on
Semenya’s side of the proportionality scales. Krech, supra note 3 at 70. Because neither can be substantiated, however, at the hearing they were merely passing implications,
and properly so. For additional development of this point in particular, see Doriane Lambelet Coleman, “A Victory for Female Athletes Everywhere”, Quillette, 3 May
2019, available at https://quillette.com/2019/05/03/a-victory-for-female-athletes-everywhere/ [Accessed 1 October 2019].
29
Individuals with 46,XY DSDs who are assigned the female sex at birth and are raised as girls but then virilise at puberty present with male secondary sex characteristics.
Unless the virilisation is particularly mild, it is unlikely that this transformation will go entirely unnoticed. See, e.g. Ariel Levy, “Either/Or: Sports, sex, and the case of
Caster Semenya”, The New Yorker, 19 November 2009, available at https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/11/30/eitheror [Accessed 1 October 2019].
30
Individuals with 46,XY DSDs do not begin to menstruate at puberty because they are biologically male. As a result, when they have been legally designated as female
and have not been diagnosed before puberty, at that point they will appear to present with amenorrhea. Depending on its causes, amenorrhea can involve a range of important
adverse health effects, which is why it is the medical standard of care to evaluate girls who have “missed at least three menstrual periods in a row, or [who have] never had
a menstrual period [by age] 15”. See Mayo Clinic, “Patient Care & Health Information, Diseases & Conditions: Amenorrhea” (2019), available at https://www.mayoclinic
.org/diseases-conditions/amenorrhea/symptoms-causes/syc-20369299 [Accessed 1 October 2019]. Undescended testes similarly risk infertility and malignancy. Because
of this, it is also the medical standard of care to address this condition, either physically or through monitoring. See, e.g. Mayo Clinic, “Patient Care & Health Information,
Diseases & Conditions: Undescended testicle” (2019), available at https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/undescended-testicle/doctors-departments/ddc-20352003
[Accessed 1 October 2019].
25
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biological females—including female athletes—regularly
undertake, as do individuals with 46,XY DSDs who want
to feminise their appearance.31 Of course, others with
46,XY DSDs may not want to do this because they are
entirely comfortable in their bodies. But these facts give
them choices they properly accept or reject based on their
individual needs and preferences, as Semenya herself has
done. That the choices may be difficult because they
involve a cost-benefit analysis involving things physical,
medical, and economic does not make them any more
unlawful or immoral than other difficult life choices
involving these factors.32
Whether the Panel’s decision was right or not similarly
depends on one’s preferences, not on law. The Panel was
comprised of three of CAS’s most well-respected jurists.
The President of the Panel, The Honorable Dr Annabelle
Bennett, is—among other things—a former Judge of the
Australian Federal Court and Commissioner of the
Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunities
Commission. She also holds a PhD in cell biology. She
and her fellow panelists—The Honorable Hugh L. Fraser
and Dr Hans Nater—were exhaustive in their review and
assessment of the case facts and scientific evidence, and
utterly meticulous in their adherence to the applicable
law. To the extent there was any room within this law for
judicial discretion, it was only in the final balancing of
individual harms against institutional ends; and like all
balancing tests, this one involved a policy choice based
on the evidence presented.
If one places an especially high value on the set of
goods that flow from providing equality of opportunity
to both males and females, and from isolating and
celebrating female champions in particular, an eligibility
rule for the women’s category that either completely
excludes biological males or that conditions their
inclusion on winding down the one trait that primarily
accounts for the performance gap makes sense. A policy
choice that risks some harm, even some relatively
significant harm, is not unlawful under any legal regime
so long as there is overriding good. To the contrary,
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is the preferred tool of most
governments and institutions as they make their policy
decisions.
This same sort of eligibility rule might not make as
much sense to the person who does not care that much
about sport, or about equality for biological females in
particular. In such circumstances, one might place a

higher value on the interests of a few individuals in being
free from the sorts of personal harm that flow to affected
athletes under the DSD Regulation. Understandably, this
remains Semenya’s own position, and it is shared by
Michele Krech, a consultant to Semenya’s legal team
whose analysis of the decision appeared in the last issue
of this journal.

III. A misplaced critique of the Semenya
decision
In her essay “The Misplaced Burdens of ‘Gender
Equality’ in Caster Semenya v. IAAF”, Michele Krech
attempts to disguise her own policy preferences as
categorical legal principles. In the process, she argues
that the Panel’s majority made numerous errors of law.
To the contrary, it is Krech’s analysis that is wrong on
any number of counts. Most importantly, it is wrong about
the IAAF’s policy objectives; wrong about state of the
scientific evidence; wrong about the Panel’s analysis,
including in particular about the burdens of production
and persuasion at issue; and wrong that this was a “failed”
human rights case.
Throughout, Krech conflates biological and legal sex.
Both biological females and males with DSD who were
assigned the female sex at birth are “females” or even
“cis-women” in her analysis.33 As a policy matter, this
move is well-regarded in circles where people share her
preference for a broadly inclusive conceptualization of
the class “women”. But as a factual matter, it elides the
essential sex-linked differences between the two groups
of athletes. This elision is innocuous in many different
contexts. However, it is problematic in this one because
the women’s category exists precisely to provide a space
where females can compete only against each other and
not also against males.34 Testes and male T levels are not
random traits, they are the reason the women’s category
is set aside for females.35 Taking them into consideration
in defining eligibility for women’s events does not
“magnify … the burden of longstanding inequality borne
by female athletes”36—it allows us to ensure its redress.
We have equality in sport only if the protected category
is in fact protected.
Krech’s description of the original history of the
women’s category in elite sport is generally accurate. In
the first instance, the Olympic Movement was not
motivated to create separate opportunities for women as
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Despite claims to the contrary, see, e.g. Sean Ingle, “Caster Semenya accuses IAAF of using her as a ‘guinea pig experiment’”, The Guardian, 18 June 2019, available
at https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2019/jun/18/caster-semenya-iaaf-athletics-guinea-pig [Accessed 1 October 2019], the DSD Regulation is the evidence-based, medical
standard of care; it is not an experiment.
32
As I have written previously, I personally prefer a rule that excludes biological males who have gone through male puberty to a rule that includes them if they identify
as women on the condition that they use hormones to drop their T levels into the female range. See “Sex in Sport” (fn.4 above), pp.123–124. I stand by this preference and
respect Semenya for hers.
33
Krech (fn.3 above), p.67.
34
See “Sex in Sport” (fn.4 above), pp.84–102 (detailing this institutional mission). See also, Semenya at 558 (“the reason for the separation between male and female
categories in competitive athletics is ultimately founded on biology … The purpose of having separate categories is to protect a class of individuals who lack certain
insuperable performance advantages from having to compete against individuals who possess those insuperable advantages”).
35
See Coleman, “A Victory for Female Athletes” (fn.28 above) (noting that “Gonadal sex traits define the categories, and then each separate category sets out to isolate
and celebrate other characteristics”).
36
Krech (fn.3 above), p.66.
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a means to establish their equality. (Baron Pierre de
Coubertin’s sexism has been amply described.37) But it
is wrong to move from there to the suggestion that the
IAAF has not had a consistent objective in its own
sex-testing history.38
For better or worse, the IAAF’s goal has long been to
protect the women’s category from male-bodied entrants.
It did not have the same scientific basis for doing this
work in earlier periods that it has today, but of course this
story is not unique either to the IAAF or to sport. Reliance
on secondary sex characteristics, including on descriptions
of individuals based on these characteristics as
“masculine” or “feminine” are ubiquitous. That these
descriptions sometimes reflect stereotypes rather than
real sex-linked differences suggests the need for caution
and care, not for sacking the enterprise. CAS was right
to find that “the reason for the separation between male
and female categories in competitive athletics is ultimately
founded on biology rather than legal status”.39 Indeed,
although strong social norms may have provided sufficient
legal support for the separation in de Coubertin’s time,
in the present period there is no viable alternative
rationale; the IAAF has to ground its eligibility rule in
sex-linked biology.
Nevertheless, Krech suggests that “[t]he lack of
scientific integrity in the evidence presented by the IAAF
has been well documented”; that at the hearing, the
scientific evidence was “highly contested … deficient …
and defective”; and that there were “substantial and
multifarious doubts about the science, [and thus about
the] ethics and legality of the IAAF’s regulations”.40 There
is no other way to put this: In repeating the false public
relations story promulgated by some of Semenya’s

supporters, Krech presents a gross mischaracterisation of
the state of the scientific evidence and of the related
aspects of the proceedings.41
The critical scientific and evidentiary points were
never in real dispute42: that testosterone distributes
bimodally, i.e. with exceptions that are inapplicable to
the non-doped, elite athlete population, the male and
female ranges do not overlap43; that testosterone is the
primary driver of the performance gap44; and that Semenya
and other affected DSD athletes have XY genetic sex,
testes, and T levels within the male not the female range,
and are at least substantially—if not—fully androgen
sensitive.45
Because she was there, Krech knows that the public
facing challenge to “the scientific integrity” of the IAAF’s
evidence waged by experts retained by ASA was not had
within the closed confines of the hearing. This is because
the underlying confidential data showing the decades-long
dominance of DSD athletes in women’s events were
irrefutable and devastating.46 Moreover, since the Panel
published its Executive Summary, each of the three
athletes who stood on the Olympic podium for the
women’s 800 metres in Rio has publicly acknowledged
that they are affected by the DSD Regulation. In the
circumstances, Krech’s suggestion that it was not
established that females are biologically disadvantaged
in relation to DSD athletes and thus that the Panel
improperly “resolve[d] scientific uncertainty in favour of
the IAAF”47 would be incomprehensible but for the fact
that she was writing here not as an academic, but as an
advocate trying to influence a lay public.
Her evaluation of the Panel’s proportionality analysis
is more complicated. As a matter of evidence law and
procedure, she is wrong in her assessment of the burdens
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See, e.g. Jules Boykoff, “How women overcame more than 100 years of Olympic controversy to take centre stage at Rio”, The Telegraph, 5 August 2016 (quoting de
Coubertin as having said, “Woman’s glory rightfully came through the number and quality of children she produced, and that where sports were concerned, her greatest
accomplishment was to encourage her sons to excel rather than to seek records for herself”).
38
Krech (fn.3 above), pp.68–69.
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See Semenya at para.559 (“On true analysis, therefore, the purpose of the male-female divide in competitive athletics is not to protect athletes with a female legal sex
from having to compete against athletes with a male legal sex. Nor is it to protect athletes with a female gender identity from having to compete against athletes with a male
gender identity. Rather, it is to protect individuals whose bodies have developed in a certain way following puberty from having to compete against individuals who, by
virtue of their bodies having developed in a different way following puberty, possess certain physical traits that create such a significant performance advantage that fair
competition between the two groups is not possible”).
40
Krech (fn.3 above), pp.71, 72.
41
This false story is prominent on social media, but also beyond. See, e.g. Sarah Laframboise, “In the ruling against Caster Semenya, bogus science is being used to stifle
the vulnerable”, Massive Science, 13 May 2019, available at https://massivesci.com/articles/caster-semenya-track-field-iaaf-olympics-testosterone-hyperandrogenism/
[Accessed 1 October 2019].
42
To be clear, Semenya and ASA did contest aspects of the science, primarily whether testosterone is “the” rather than “a” primary driver of the performance gap, and
whether 5-ARD might have more than its currently known genital tissue-specific effects. But these were not weighty matters, because the prepositional argument (in the
first instance) and the scientific hypothesis (in the second) were both unsupported and so, consistent with standard evidence law, both were properly dismissed by the Panel.
With respect to the prepositional argument in particular, see below note 42. With respect to the ARD hypothesis, see below note 45. With respect to the associated burden
of proof issues, see below notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
43
Unlike in Chand, the parties in Semenya did not disagree that testosterone distributes bimodally and that the different male and female T ranges are primarily responsible
for the performance gap between male and female athletes. See Semenya at 489 (emphasis added) (“It is accepted by all parties that circulating testosterone has an effect
from puberty, in increasing bone and muscle size and strength and the levels of haemoglobin in the blood. After puberty, the male testes produce (on average) 7 mg of
testosterone per day, while the female testosterone production level stays at about 0.25 mg per day. The normal female range of serum testosterone (excluding cases of
PCOS), produced mainly in the ovaries and adrenal glands, is 0.06 to 1.68 nmol/L. The normal male range of serum testosterone concentration, produced mainly in the
testes, is 7.7 to 29.4 nmol/L.”)
44
Semenya at 492 and 493 (“… the overwhelming majority view [of the parties’ expert witnesses] was that testosterone is the primary driver of the physical advantages
and, therefore, of the sex difference in sports performance, between males and females … Having considered all of the scientific evidence adduced by the parties, the Panel
accepts this conclusion”).
45
Semenya alleged that the deficiency in the enzyme that characterizes 5-ARD might have some post-pubertal muscular and thus adverse performance effects. But her
experts produced little scientific evidence to support this hypothesis, and the CAS Panel concluded that “such an effect (if it exists at all) is at most modest compared to the
effect of testosterone”. Semenya at 495.
46
See Semenya at 537 (“In reaching this conclusion, the majority of the Panel highlights in particular the notable statistical over-representation of female athletes with
5-ARD … In the majority of the Panel’s view, those statistics provide compelling evidence that the physical characteristics associated with 5-ARD give female athletes
with that condition a significant and frequently determinative performance advantage over other female athletes who do not have a 46 XY DSD. The contrast between the
rare incidence of 5-ARD in the general population and the overwhelming success that women with 5-ARD have achieved … provides powerful evidential support for the
conclusion that female athletes with 5-ARD have a significant performance advantage”).
47
Krech (fn.3 above), p.71.
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of production and persuasion. But her evaluation of the
Panel’s interests balancing is certainly defensible. I
happen to disagree with her conclusions, but as I have
already noted, this prong of the analysis was and remains
legitimately contested ground.
Krech’s essay is titled “The Misplaced Burdens”, and
throughout the implication is that the Panel either did not
know what it was doing or else disregarded the applicable
standards.48 Although judges can certainly be wrong and
called out for their errors, this is simply not the case here.
It is universally accepted in law that the burdens in a
discrimination case are on the petitioner to prove
discrimination and, if she carries her burden, they shift
to the respondent to prove justification and
proportionality. In each instance, the burden of proof
consists of the pleading burden, the production (of
evidence) burden, and the burden of persuasion. Where
a party has met their prima facie obligation, in effect, the
burden shifts to the other side.
As set out in Part II, the IAAF properly assumed the
burden of proving that its DSD Regulation is justified by
necessity and that the risk of harm to affected athletes is
acceptable or proportionate. Once it did this, the burden
effectively shifted to Semenya to rebut that case. She did
not have to accept that burden, but had she declined, the
state of the evidence would have been as the IAAF left
it, i.e. strongly in organization’s favour. She lost because
she did not succeed in persuading more than one of the
three panelists that she had neutralised the weight of the
IAAF’s case on proportionality.
Notably, no one—including on the IAAF’s side of the
case—contested the proposition that the DSD Regulation
would have negative effects on affected athletes, including
Semenya. Like any rulemaking process, this one involved
a cost-benefit analysis, and the nature and extent of the
costs are well-understood.49 But, as detailed in Part II,
Semenya was ultimately unable to persuade the Panel
majority that the ways in which she would be affected
were weighty enough to override both the enormous good
that a protected female category produces for sport’s
various stakeholders, and the damage that making
exceptions for male-bodied athletes who identify as
women does and would continue to do to the category.
In part, this was because the false claims that the IAAF
has caused egregious harm that have proliferated in the
media were not pressed in the proceedings. (Semenya’s
legal team, like the IAAF’s, is one of the best and most
ethical in the business.) Mainly, though, it is because no

small group of individuals has the right to demand a
category defeating accommodation in circumstances
where that category is understood to be a high value social
good.
Krech is one of a number of academics currently
working on the development of global governance norms
and pushing for their applicability to private organisations,
including to private sports organisations.50 Their theory
is that like public entities and governments, private
international organisations and multinational corporations
“govern” people’s lives and opportunities in ways that
ought to be regulated according to civil and human rights
principles.51 Work is also ongoing among academics and
advocates to codify human rights protections for people
who are intersex and transgender.52 Both efforts are
intellectually deep and their practical value is enormously
promising. As doctrinal claims, however, they are lacking
an established foundation. As a result, so does Krech’s
final argument.
Semenya v IAAF is not a failed human rights case for
the same reason that is is not a failed discrimination case.53
Human rights law prohibits discrimination on the same
grounds as domestic law; and it requires that sex
discrimination be evaluated for lawfulness also on the
same grounds. The Panel followed precisely these
requirements in reaching its conclusion that the DSD
Regulation is “necessary and reflect[s] a rational
resolution of conflicting human rights”.54
Indeed, in so holding, the Panel was generous in its
reading of the human rights of affected DSD athletes.
Although everyone has the right to participate in sport,
no one has the right to compete and to win in elite
competition without regard to legitimate eligibility
criteria. Although everyone has the right to be free from
discrimination, that right is never absolute; it is always
subject to well-justified exceptions. The same is true of
the rights to personal autonomy, bodily integrity, and
economic freedom. No legal system provides for
unfettered individual liberty; it is always ordered
according to prevailing goals and values.
Most specifically, there is no established human rights
law that demands that Member States and organisations
disregard biological sex in their efforts to secure equality
for the females within their purview. Indeed, the IAAF’s
policy choice to set aside a protected category for
females—as implemented by nations around the
world—does not violate established human rights law, it
promotes it. Nor is there established human rights law
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Krech (fn.3 above), e.g. pp.66, 68, 70, 71, 75.
The parties to the case disagreed, of course, over the nature of some and the extent of others. See above notes 28–32 and accompanying text (discussing these points of
disagreement).
50
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See, e.g. below note 56 (citing to the High Commissioner’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights).
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See, e.g. ILGA Europe, Anti-discrimination Law, What is the current situation in Europe?, available at https://www.ilga-europe.org/what-we-do/our-advocacy-work/anti
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that requires that where the two collide, the interests of
people who are intersex or transgender who identify as
women supersede the human rights of females. Positions
to the contrary are, to date, just advocacy,55 and CAS’s
institutional authority does not include altering or growing
the substance of international human rights law.56
Consistent with the terms of her engagement with
CAS, Semenya has appealed its decision upholding the
DSD Regulation to the Swiss Federal Tribunal (SFT), on
the ground that its effects would violate the substantive
public policy of Switzerland. As I understand it, this
public policy includes any established international
human rights law to which Switzerland adheres. However
the case comes out, it is likely the apparent absence of
such law—together with the strength of the New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards57—that explains the SFT’s
interim decision in late July to keep the DSD Regulation
in place while it is considering the merits of Semenya’s
appeal.58

IV. Conclusion
The answer to the normative question whether
international human rights law should prohibit any
physical conditions on the inclusion of intersex and
transgender women in the women’s category in elite sport

depends on how one chooses to value that unconditional
inclusion in relation to the goal of equality for biological
females in this setting. Does it still matter that we see
female-bodied champions on the podium—regardless of
how they identify, or is it enough (or better) that we see
champions who identify as women—regardless of their
sex? My own view is that the broader social good that
flows from sport’s ability to celebrate the former
outweighs the harms that result from excluding or
conditioning the inclusion of the latter. But I respect that
others can and do view this issue differently.
Ultimately, where they are evidence-based, the
different positions that have been developed in the context
of this case can be helpful beyond sport. The CAS
decision in Semenya & ASA v IAAF is the first out of a
court with a broad international mandate to confront
squarely the collision between (on one side) the
well-established civil and human rights of females to
equality in relation to males—including to the use of
sex-affirmative measures to secure that equality, and (on
the other) the just-emerging rights of individuals to be
classified into and out of sex-segregated spaces and
opportunities based on their identity rather than their
biology. The answer should not always be the same, but
the decision provides a template for other courts as they
face variations on this most challenging jurisprudential
theme.
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-reaffirm-opposition-to-iaaf-rules/ [Accessed 1 October 2019].
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